We report on a recent implementation of Giesbrecht's algorithm for factoring polynomials in a skew-polynomial ring. We also discuss the equivalence between factoring polynomials in a skew-polynomial ring and decomposing p s -polynomials over a finite field, and how Giesbrecht's algorithm is outlined in some detail by Ore in the 1930's. We end with some observations on the security of the Hidden Field Equation (HFE) cryptosystem, where p-polynomials play a central role.
Introduction and Background
Let F q denote the finite field with q = p e elements, p a prime. We use F * q to denote the non-zero elements of F q . The polynomial ring in an indeterminate X over any field K will be denoted by K[X] and for f, g ∈ K[X], f • g = f (g) represents the composition of f with g. We recall that a permutation polynomial is a polynomial which permutes the elements of the finite field under evaluation. A p-polynomial (sometimes called an additive or linearised polynomial) is a polynomial L ∈ F q [X] of the shape
with a i ∈ F q . More specifically, for any integer s, a p s -polynomial is a ppolynomial where a i = 0 whenever i is not a multiple of s. We note that p s -polynomials are closed under composition (this is simply established). The problem of completely decomposing a polynomial f ∈ K[X] into indecomposable factors, where K is a field, has a long and rich history. When K is the complex plane, Ritt 23 showed that there exists an essentially unique decomposition for any chosen polynomial. It is unique in the sense that for any f ∈ K[X] in a complete decomposition of f : the number of factors is invariant; and the degrees of the factors are unique up to permutation. So, if we have two complete decompositions
then m = n and deg(f i ) = deg(g π(i) ) for some permutation π of {1, . . . , m}. Any class of polynomials defined over a field for which this property holds is commonly said to satisfy Ritt's theorem. 14 . These results were improved for the tame case over a finite field by von zur Gathen 12 . A general purpose polynomial-time algorithm for finding a complete decomposition of a rational function over an arbitrary field was given by Zippel 26 . This last algorithm provides a method for decomposing any polynomial, wild or tame, over a finite field. However, one should note that in the wild case, the algorithm simply finds any complete decomposition, as there does not necessarily exist an essentially unique decomposition.
Although p-polynomials were the first polynomials over a finite field shown to satisfy Ritt's theorem, they are the latest class of polynomials for which a polynomial-time decomposition algorithm has been given. The algorithm we refer to was described and analysed by Giesbrecht 13 . Giesbrecht presents his algorithm in terms of factoring in skew-polynomial rings but it is well known (and we later show) that the problem he considers is equivalent to decomposing p-polynomials over a finite field. We note that any decomposition algorithm for p 19 . This subject is covered in another paper under preparation by the authors.
In this article, we report on a successful implementation of Giesbrecht's algorithm, making some specific comments concerning the probabilistic part of the algorithm. We also recall the work of Oystein Ore, showing how Giesbrecht's algorithm is equivalent to an algorithm described by Ore sixty years earlier. We also consider implications of Ore's work to the security of the Hidden Field Equations (HFE) cryptosystem.
Giesbrecht's algorithm and the work of Ore

Giesbrecht
13 introduces a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for obtaining a complete (essentially unique) factorisation of a polynomial in some classes of skew-polynomial ring defined over a finite field. This problem is intimately connected to the problem of determining an essentially unique complete decomposition of p-polynomials, a class of wild polynomials. In fact, there is a one-one correspondence between factoring in a particular skewpolynomial ring over a finite field and decomposing p s -polynomials over a finite field.
The skew-polynomial ring F q [Y ; σ], where Y is an indeterminate and σ is an automorphism of F q , is a ring of polynomials with the usual componentwise addition, and with multiplication defined by Y a = σ(a)Y for any a ∈ F q (we simply use juxtaposition to represent multiplication in F q [X] and F q [Y ; σ]). Since σ is an automorphism of F q , we must have σ(a) = a p s for some integer s. Given the definition of multiplication above, it is easily seen that the skew-polynomial ring F q [Y ; σ] is isomorphic to the ring of p s -polynomials over F q with the operations of polynomial addition and composition. Explicitly, the required isomorphism Φ satisfies Φ(
. From this it follows that composition of p s -polynomials acts in exactly the same manner as multiplication in the skew-polynomial ring
The theory given by Giesbrecht 13 is foreshadowed in the works of Ore 19, 20, 21 . It may be more efficient to implement Giesbrecht's algorithm using the p s -polynomial representation of the ring rather than the skewpolynomial ring representation as set out in Giesbrecht's article but this is yet to be tested. While Giesbrecht refers to Ore 20 , it is in Ore's other two papers that he implicitly develops the algorithm which Giesbrecht has produced. Giesbrecht's key contribution is to find a way of computing the crucial step, which is to find non-zero zero divisors in a small algebra. He does this by using what he refers to as Eigen rings. Ore 19 discusses the same method in Chapter 2, Section 6 where he uses invariant rings. In particular, Ore's Theorem 12 of that section is the key idea in Giesbrecht's algorithm. Of course, Ore develops his theory in terms of p s -polynomials rather than skew-polynomial rings. Ore obtains these results using an earlier paper, Ore 20 , where he developed theory on factoring and primality of polynomials in more general skew-polynomial rings than discussed here. The problem of developing algorithms for factoring polynomials over other specific skew-polynomial ring remains open.
Recently, a successful implementation of Giesbrecht's algorithm was produced by Larissa Meinecke at the University of Queensland using the Magma 4 algebra package. There is one step in Giesbrecht's algorithm which is probabilistic in nature, the rest of the algorithm is strictly deterministic. Giesbrecht gives a lower bound for the probability of this step being successful as 1/9. We have carried out some testing regarding this step which suggests this lower bound is very conservative. While we have been unable to determine a worstcase scenario, in almost all cases tested, the step has been successful on the first attempt.
HFE and p-polynomials
The Hidden Field Equation (HFE) cryptosystem was introduced by Patarin 22 . HFE is a public key cryptosystem and can be described as follows:
1. Choose a finite field F q , q = p e , and a basis (β 1 , . . . , β e ) for F q over F p .
2. Select a polynomial D of "relatively small degree" with the shape
where a ij ∈ F q for all i, j.
3. Choose two p-polynomials, S and T , that permute F q .
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and publish F q and the n i , 1 ≤ i ≤ e. The polynomials S, T and D are the secret keys.
If someone wishes to send a message m to the owner of E(X), then they simply calculate E(m) = y and send y. Decryption is carried out by performing the following steps. As S and T are permutation polynomials, they have functional and compositional (modulo X q − X) inverses. As S and T are known to the owner, they can determine the inverse polynomials modulo X q − X (note that these inverses are also p-polynomials). Thus the recipient of the message y knows S, D, T , S −1 and T −1 . They determine z satisfying S −1 (y) = z = D(T (m)). Next they determine any m 1 ∈ F q so that D(m 1 ) = z. Once m 1 is chosen they determine m = T −1 (m 1 ). The middle step is only computationally feasible because the degree of D is chosen to be "small".
The security of the system relies on the assumption that if deg(E) is large, then solving for m in E(m) = y is computationally infeasible. Note that several m 1 ∈ F q may need to be tried to find a "sensible" message m. This is because D is not necessarily chosen to be a permutation of F q as the authors of HFE assumed that this may be too difficult. However, Blokhuis et al. 3 have since given examples of permutation polynomials from this class. Note that it makes no difference whether the polynomial E or the set of e polynomials n i is published if the basis used is known. In fact, an attacker need not know the basis chosen as they may choose any basis to reconstruct a different, but effectively equivalent encryption function (see the discussion below). If E is constructed from the e polynomials n i using a different basis, alternative secret keys S, T and D may be obtained and used to decipher messages.
The HFE system is one of a family of cryptosystems which use functional composition. Recently, some general attacks for these systems were developed by Ye 
and D • L are both DO polynomials. In other words, DO polynomials are closed under composition with p-polynomials. Also, it can be established that the reduction of a DO polynomial modulo X q − X is again a DO polynomial. The HFE description given above works in exactly the same way as that given by Patarin 22 precisely because of the above comments, coupled with the well known fact that any function over F q can be represented by a polynomial in F q [X] of degree less than q and a well known result concerning linear operators (discussed below).
Kipnis and Shamir 16 note several problems an attacker faces when they consider this scheme. We address some of their concerns here. In the original description of HFE, two linear transformations (or linear operators) over the vector space F e p are chosen, rather than two linearised polynomials as described above. Kipnis and Shamir comment that "these mixing operations have natural interpretation over F p but not over F p e , and it is not clear apriori that the e published polynomials over F p can be described by a single univariate polynomial G over F p e ". In fact, there is a natural interpretation. Roman
24
(pages 184-5) shows that every linear operator on F e p can be represented by a linearised polynomial over F p e . So the description of HFE as given above is equivalent. As DO polynomials are closed under composition with linearised polynomials and their reduction modulo X q − X still results in a DO, we are guaranteed that the published polynomials can be described by a single univariate polynomial: it must be a DO. Kipnis and Shamir continue "Even if it exists (a single univariate polynomial), it may have an exponential number of coefficients, and even if it is sparse, it may have an exponentially large degree which makes it practically unsolvable". As the resulting polynomial is a DO polynomial, it has O(e 2 ) terms (compare to a random polynomial which has O(p e ) terms), which is not exponential. Certainly, the degree may be large. It remains our objective, then, of finding a method of reducing the size of the degree.
We can make more comments concerning the univariate description of HFE given above. Let E(X) be the public key, which is a DO polynomial. Suppose we can determine p-polynomials L 1 and L 2 which are permutation polynomials and satisfy L 1 • f • L 2 = E. Clearly, f must also be a DO polynomial. Then we can decrypt any message sent to the owner of E using exactly the same method used to decrypt in the standard way, but using the polynomials L 1 , L 2 and f , providing the degree of f is sufficiently small. Of course, it may not be possible to determine p-polynomials that permute F q which are left or right decompositional factors of E(X). However, when considering this problem, the following result by Coulter and Matthews 6 , immediately draws our attention. For any a ∈ F q and any polynomial t ∈ F q [X], define the difference polynomial of t with respect to a by ∆ t,a (X) = t(X + a) − t(X) − t(a). Theorem 1 Let f ∈ F q [X] with deg(f ) < q. The following conditions are equivalent.
This result provides an alternative definition of DO polynomials and establishes an important connection between DO polynomials and p-polynomials.
Let E be the published DO polynomial used in the HFE cryptosystem. We wish to find
• f and underline that f is also a DO polynomial. Our objective is to determine some information regarding L 1 . By Theorem 1, ∆ E,a is a p-polynomial for any choice of a. Moreover, we have
Thus for any non-zero choice of a, the polynomial L 1 is a left decompositional factor of ∆ E,a . Ore 20 shows that there exists a left and right decomposition algorithm similar to the well known greatest common divisor algorithm for a large class of non-commutative polynomial rings (note that, in general, commutativity for composition does not hold). He uses these results in Ore 19 to establish and describe such algorithms for p-polynomials specifically. In particular, using a variant of the Euclidean algorithm, we can determine the Greatest Common Left-Decompositional Factor (GCLDF) of two p-polynomials. This suggests the following method of attack to determine the polynomial L 1 .
Choose distinct elements
and we are done.
4. If L is not a left decompositional factor of E, then choose a new a ∈ F * q , distinct from previous choices, and calculate L(X) = GCLDF(L(X), ∆ E,a (X)). Return to Step 3.
We make the following observations. Step 3 can be carried out in time O(log p (deg(E))) so has complexity much less than the Euclidean algorithm calculation required in step 2 or 4. Note also that as Ore's work does not extend to DO polynomials, one cannot simply calculate GCLDF(L(X), E(X)) to obtain L 1 .
As mentioned, Giesbrecht's algorithm determines a complete decomposition of a p-polynomial in probabilistic polynomial-time. However, this does not mean we can determine L 1 methodically by completely decomposing L after step 2. Due to the nature of Ritt's theorem, we are not guaranteed that in a full decomposition the proper factors of L 1 would be determined strictly on the left. Further, the number of possible full decompositions is exponential in the number of indecomposable factors. We make no claims at this point concerning the number of GCLDF calculations required in step 4 to determine L 1 . It may require O(q) such calculations, making the algorithm no better than exhaustive search. Finally, we note that this attack does not necessarily break HFE as the DO polynomial may not have a non-trivial GCLDF and even if it did then the resulting DO polynomial may not be of "sufficiently small" degree. We are undertaking further research to analyse this attack and to determine other methods of attacking HFE using the connections between the DO polynomial and p s -polynomial classes.
